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Judicial Supervision of Legislative
Classifications-A More Modest Role for Equal
Protection?
Edward L. Barrett, Jr. *
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,' the United States Supreme Court
asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."
Nine decades later, however, neither the members of the Supreme Court nor constitutional law scholars are able to find substantial agreement as to how far the courts should go in invalidating legislation2because it is not "equal." This lack of agreement
is not surprising since judicial review under the equal protection
clause raises broad problems as to the respective roles of courts
and legislatures.
Judicial review of legislation has long been a settled feature
. ~ Constitution imposes a wide
of our government ~ t r u c t u r eThe
variety of constraints upon the legislative process that operate as
guidelines for the exercise of judicial review. Many of these constraints are relatively specific-"No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five
Yearsv4-and have posed no problems for the courts. Most of the
litigation, however, has resulted from the broader constitutional
provisions that, in effect, designate certain interests as protected.
For example, the commerce clause has been construed as protect* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of John Poulos, Carol Bruch,
and Jean Love in commenting on early drafts of this article.
1. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
2. For convenience, this article uses the general term legislation to encompass all
forms of legislative activity-federal, state, and local. Lawmaking that takes the form of
administrative rule-making or other less formal methods of creating law is ignored. It is
assumed that the Fifth Amendment imposes the substance of the equal protection limitation on the federal government.
No attempt has been made to adorn this "think-piece" with elaborate footnote documentation. The discussion is limited to the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court.
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),marked the beginning of
judicial review in this country.
4. U.S. CONST.art. I, 9 2.
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ing the interest in freedom of trade among the states.The First
Amendment protects the interest, among others, in freedom of
speech and the press; the Fourth Amendment, the interest in
privacy of person, premises, and possessions against indiscriminate official interference; and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
taken together, the interest in providing a fair trial for persons
accused of crime. The effect of constitutional provisions such as
these is to invalidate legislation that conflicts with the protected
interest. When such legislation is challenged in court, the judiciary faces the difficult task of interpreting and applying the relevant constitutional provisions to the legislation.
The Fourteenth Amendment provision that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws," however, does not describe such an easily definable
protected interest, and thus raises a number of difficult analytical
problems. I t can be interpreted as protecting the interest in
equality, as implied by the assertion in Yick Wo that it constitutes a pledge of the protection of "equal laws." Yet it is clear
that it cannot be a guarantee that every law shall apply equally
to every person, for almost all legislation involves classifications
placing special burdens on or granting special benefits to individuals or groups. Hence, the Supreme Court has held from the
beginning that the clause "does not deny to States the power to
treat different classes of persons in different ways? But if equal
protection does not deny the power to classify-to treat different
classes of people in different ways-then what is its effect?
The Supreme Court today finds in the equal protection
clause three analytically separate limitations on legislative
power. First, the Court holds that certain bases for classification
may be used, if at all, only in unusual circumstances-they are
"suspect" classifications. In one of the earliest cases, the Court
said of the equal protection clause: "What is this but declaring
that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for
the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand
equal before the laws of the States . . . ."' Later, it extended the
protection to prohibit classification based generally on race or
5. See, e.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U S . 20 (1974).
6. Reed v. Reed, 404 U S . 71, 75 (1971). For a recent article asserting that the equal
protection clause creates a value of "constitutional equality" and that the focus of the
Court should be on determining the categories of equality which courts should enforce see
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of
Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
7. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880).
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nationality? More recently, it has proscribed classifications
based on alienagegand, arguably, those based on sexl%nd illegitimacy.I1In effect, the Court is saying that equal protection constitutes a guarantee of "equal laws" to the extent that it substantially limits the power of legislatures to use certain bases for
classification.
The Court has not clarified the circumstances under which
suspect classifications may be justified. It has said that such
classifications must be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny,"I2
but has not made it clear whether the classifications are per se
invalid or whether they may be sustained if necessary to achieve
a legitimate state objective. Even if they may be sustained, the
questions of how important the state interest must be, and how
closely related the classification must be to that interest, have not
been answered.13 Also undefined is the standard used to determine whether a particular classifying trait is "suspect."
Second, the Supreme Court holds that legislative classifications which burden constitutionally protected interestsI4 are invalid if not closely related to important or substantial governmental objectives. The rule as articulated by the Court is that a
classification burdening a protected interest unconstitutionally
denies equal protection unless it can be demonstrated that the
classification advances a "compelling" state interest, that it is
closely related to that state interest, and that a less burdensome
classification would not adequately serve the governmental interest.'This second limitation applies whether or not the legislature
8. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 374 (1886).
9. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); see discussion in Section 11, C, 1, infra.
10. See discussion in Section 11, C, 2, infra.
11. See discussion in Section 11, C, 3, infra.
12. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), citing Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
OF JUDICIAL
DECI13. For an excellent analysis of these issues see P. BREST,PROCESS
SION MAKING-CASES
AND MATERIALS
477-92 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BREST].
14. The Court has also characterized this doctrine as applying when the classification
burdens a fundamental interest. Apparently the Court now utilizes the term fundamental
in this context to mean only interests "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). This issue
is further discussed in Section III infra.
15. See, e.g., the formulation in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
258 (1974).
Mr. John Poulos contributed a number of ideas to this article. One of his criticisms
has, however, increased the awkwardness of expression apparent a t many points. The
Court usually speaks of the right to vote, the right to travel, the right to speak, and so
forth, and it is easy to use such terminology. As Poulos notes, however, the word right
represents the conclusion one reaches after determining that the constitutionally pro-
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uses a constitutionally suspect classifying trait. A number of
questions are raised by this formulation. What does equal protection analysis add to the substantive constitutional protection of
the interest? How substantial must the burden on the protected
interest be? How important must the asserted governmental
interest be? How close must the relationship be between the
classification and the state interest? What is the scope of the
protection afforded under this approach?
Third, the Court holds that legislation may be invalid when
a classification made therein is not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. While equal protection does not deny the
right to classify, it does deny
the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to
persons placed by a statute. into different classes on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. "I6

This limitation applies whether or not the legislature uses a constitutionally suspect classification or burdens a constitutionally
protected interest. The major question under this analysis is the
extent of the protection accorded to the interest in freedom from
irrational classifications. To what extent does this third limitation require legislatures to identify social goals and make only
those classifications that are rationally related to those goals?
Three cases will serve to illustrate the distinctions among
these applications of equal protection. In the first, a statute excluding resident aliens from the receipt of welfare benefits was
held invalid because "classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny."17 In the second, a statute denying welfare assistance to residents who had not resided within the state
for a year was held invalid because it served "to penalize the
exercise" of the constitutionally protected "right" to travel and
tected interest is important enough to outweight the legislative interest which supports
the particular burden. Therefore, this article uses the term interests rather than rights
except where quoting from the Court.
16. Reed v. Reed, 404 US. 71, 75-76 (1971) (citation omitted).
17. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
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the state had not shown that the statutory scheme was "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest."18 Finally,
a statute providing lower welfare payments for dependent
children than for the aged was upheld because it did not use a
suspect classification, burden a constitutionally protected interest, or fail the general test of rationality-there was some relationship between the classification and the state objective.Ig
As noted above, each of these three approaches raises a series
of questions. It is the purpose of this article to analyze each approach in light of these questions. The article proceeds from a
point of view generally favoring confinement of judicial review to
the application of those constraints upon legislation that can be
. ~ ~will
found, in some principled manner, in the C o n s t i t ~ t i o nAs
be seen, the conclusion that equal protection should play a more
modest role is not necessarily a conclusion that the courts should
not extend similar protections through application of other constitutional provisions.

A.

The General Scope of the Doctrine

What is the general scope of the protection afforded by the
doctrine that equal protection makes certain classifying traits
constitutionally "suspect?" Essentially, the protection forbids all
legislation which discriminates against-singles out for special
treatment-those possessing a certain trait. It should not matter
whether the burden imposed is large or small since the evil is in
Conversely, since the suspect classithe use of the clas~ification.~'
fication doctrine applies only when the trait is used as a basis for
imposing a burden, the doctrine should not serve to invalidate
legislation that imposes even severe burdens on persons possessing the classifying trait, provided it also imposes the same burdens on others.22Hence, this doctrine is quite distinct from the
--

18. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U S . 618, 634 (1969).
19. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.535, 546, 549 (1972).
20. The author first became aware of constitutional problems a t a time when the
Court was using expansive interpretations of equal protection and due process largely to
protect economic vested interests-a fact which has left a lingering suspicion that generally the courts may not be relied upon to serve the people's interests any better than do
the political processes. In any event, the analysis which follows hopefully will be useful
even to those who seek a more activist role for the courts.
21. The Court analyzed the problem in almost this fashion in Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
22. The point is involved in cases where the Court denies a claim under equal protec-
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more common constitutional provisions that extend substantive
protection to particular interests. First Amendment cases illustrate this distinction. A law requiring only particular ethnic organizations to obtain a permit from the chief of police before
using a public park for meetings would be invalid under suspect
classification analysis because it makes a classification based on
race or national origin, and under First Amendment analysis because it unduly burdens the exercise of First Amendment rights.2R
But a law requiring any group to obtain a permit from the chief
of police before using the public park for a meeting might be held
invalid as unduly burdening First Amendment interests in its
application to an ethnic organization or any other organization
seeking to use the park for political meetings, even though it does
not single out either ethnic .or political groups for special treatment .24
A major question posed by suspect classification analysis is
whether there are any situations in which legislation utilizing a
suspect classification can be upheld. In analogous cases involving
constitutionally protected interests the Supreme Court has said,
in effect, that legislation discriminating against the interests will
be held invalid without concern as to the extent of the burden
imposed. Should the result be the same when a suspect classification is involved? In recent decades, the Court has not upheld
It has said,
any legislation utilizing a suspect classifi~ation.~
however, that such a classification might be upheld if the state
demonstrates that the classification is necessary to the attainment of' an important or "compelling" state interest.26
Since the suspect classification doctrine began with race, this
article will first examine these questions in the context of racial
classifications. Thereafter, the article will examine the same
questions, as well as the question of which classifications beyond
race are constitutionally suspect, in the context of classifications
related to alienage, sex, and illegitimacy.
tion because the complainant failed to show that a classification was in fact based on race.
See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,620 (1974);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965).
23. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
24. See, e.g., Love11 v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
25. The only case in which the Court clearly has done so is Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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B. Racial Classifications
The equal protection clause was clearly intended to invalidate a t least certain racial classification^.^^ In the first case arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court said:
[I]t is not difficult to give a meaning to [the equal protection] clause. The existence of laws in the States where the
newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with
gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil
to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.28

A few years later, in Strauder v. West V i r g i n i ~the
, ~ ~Court invalidated a law limiting jury service to white persons. It said of the
clause:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall
be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection
the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination
shall be made against them by law because of their color?3o

While these cases could have been read as holding only that
the black race is a constitutionally suspect classification, the
Court soon extended the interpretation to include classifications
The Court now states
based on other races and nati~nalities.~'
that the "clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination in the state^."^^
What is the scope of this doctrine? Does it forbid all racial
classifications, or does it permit them to some extent? In
Korematsu v. United States,33the only case in which the Court
has directly upheld a racial classification, the Court said:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi27. See generally Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection
of the Laws," 1972 WASH.U.L.Q. 421.
28. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U S . (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
29. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
30. Id. at 307.
31. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U S . 356, 369, 374 (1886). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U S . 363, 372 (1971) (assertion that classifications based "on nationality or race"
are inherently suspect).
32. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U S . 1, 10 (1967).
33. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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ately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.34

More recently, the Court stated in Loving v. Virginia:"
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands
that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the "most rigid
scrutiny," . . . and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be
shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.36

Given that racial classifications are not prohibited absolutely, when might such classifications be permitted? Two narrowly limited types of cases appear to justify racial classifications
without detracting from the policy considerations that make such
classifications suspect. The first type of case involves situations
in which race is substantially congruent with some significanv7
social policy. If it can be shown, for example, that a particular
disease is almost wholly confined to members of a particular racial group, it should not be a violation of equal protection to limit
to members of that group the regulations necessary to prevent the
. ~ ~ second type of case involves a racial
disease from ~ p r e a d i n gThe
classification, used only for the duration of an emergency, that is
the only available classification to avert a serious public danger.
For example, if a race riot erupts in a prison, it should be permissible to immediately separate the races until it is possible to
identify and deal with the troublemakers on a nonracial basis.3g
But beyond cases of these types, should a state be permitted
to use racial classifications where it can show that there is a close
34. Id. a t 216.
35. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
36. Id. a t 11.
37. This limitation is important. The point is discussed in BREST,supra note 13, at
488-89.
38. There may be, of course, other constitutional objections to such a program. See,
e.g., Comment, Constitutional and Practical Considerations in Mandatory Sickle Cell
Anemia Testing, 7 U.C.D.L. REV.509 (1974).
39. The point is discussed in Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP.CT. REV.1, 25-26 [hereinafter cited
as Posner]. If the result in Korematsu is justifiable, it is on an application of this principle. I t does not derogate from the principle itself to believe that the facts did not warrant
its application there.
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correlation between race and an important state objective? In
cases involving racial segregation, the Court has long held that
such segregation cannot be justified by showing that it will preThe current situavent violence and disorder in the c~mmunity.'~
tions in Boston and Louisville4' demonstrate that a community
can have very important interests a t stake that could be protected by permitting the continuance of segregation found by the
courts to be unconstitutionally discriminatory. Yet the courts
have clearly held that such interests are not sufficiently compelling to justify continuing the discrimination.
A similar situation relating to the constitutionality of racial
classification involves the validity of so-called "benign discrimination."42 For example, can legislation designed to aid minority
racial groups be upheld? If so, on what theory? Most commentators have suggested that the constitutional question should be
resolved in terms of the relationship of the classification to the
state objective and the importance of that objective. Supporters
of benign discrimination have suggested that the showing of a
close relationship either to a compelling state interest or, less
rigidly, to a substantial or significant state interest, might justify
the use of racial classification^.^^ One commentator has gone further and argued that racial classifications made by a white majority to its own disadvantage should be upheld upon a mere showing of some relationship to a legitimate state interested4
The difficulty with these formulations is that they appear to
relax significantly the general standards by which suspect classifications have been judged. If a state interest in expanding the
opportunities for a disadvantaged racial group is sufficiently important to justify imposing burdens on others because of their
race, why is not the state interest in preventing violence and
bloodshed sufficient to justify the discrimination involved in perpetuating a neighborhood school policy in Boston?" Of course, if
-

-

-

40. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60, 81 (1917).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1976, a t 4, col. 2.
42. See Posner, supra note 39; Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education:
Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV.653 (1975).
43. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law
L. REV. 559 (1975); Karst & Horwitz, Affirmative Action
School Admissions, 75 COLUM.
and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV.955 (1974); O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher
Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV.925 (1974); O'Neil, After Defunis: Filling
the Constitutional Vacuum, 27 U. FLA.L. REV.315 (1975).
44. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI.L. REV.
723 (1974).
45. For a useful exposition of the point of view that benign discriminations violate
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the equal protection clause were held, as the Court originally
suggested, to make suspect only legislation discriminating
against the black race, or by reasonable extension, other minority
races subjected to community discrimination, this problem would
disappear. Just as the privileges and immunities clause proscribes placing special burdens on nonresident citizens but permits placing special burdens on residents, so equal protection
could be construed as not rendering suspect those classifications
that burden majority or advantaged races. Both judicial decisions
and wise policy, however, appear to militate against adopting
such a restrictive meaning for equal protection in the context of
racial classifications.
Another approach is possible that arguably would permit
some forms of benign discrimination without running afoul of the
basic values underlying the doctrine that race is a suspect classification. The original intention of equal protection was to protect
the former slaves from discriminatory legislation. From this history, it is possible to generalize as a constitutional goal a society
in which race is irrelevant as a basis for governmental action.
Given this goal, some classifications based on race may be justifiable to the extent and for the period necessary to compensate for
the effects of past discrimination and to bring a racial group to a
social, political, and economic level a t which the treatment of
race as irrelevant will not leave the group a t a disadvantage. The
Supreme Court has taken this approach in school desegregation
cases, holding that racial classifications may be used to eliminate
the effects of past official discrimination." One could move beyond these cases to argue more broadly that where members of a
racial group are not fairly represented in the community-in education, employment, and housing-because of a history of community (if not overt governmental) discrimination, then legislation designed to assist that group to achieve fair representation
is consistent with equal protection.
Even this argument for upholding some benign discriminaequal protection see Posner, supra note 39. For an elaborate rejoinder to Posner see
Sandalow, supra note 42. Sandalow suggests that an argument can be made for using race
as a basis for preferential law school admissions policies, not because race is equated with
deprivation, but because race is socially significant, and important community values can
be served only by achieving a substantial representation of certain racial groups in law
schools and eventually in the bar. On this basis, racial preferences might be the only
feasible means of achieving the goal. Id. a t 682-92.
46. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U S . 1 (1971).
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tion creates a number of difficult problems. Must such affirmative assistance be limited to those members of the discriminated
group who are still suffering from the discrimination, or can it be
given solely on the basis of the possession of the racial characteristic? That is, can special assistance be provided only to poor and
deprived members of the minority group, or may it be given to
all? How long is the preference justified? In other words, when has
the group achieved sufficient parity with other groups that the
need for preference ends? How are allocations of limited resources
to be made among competing disadvantaged groups? How substantial shall the preference be? Is parity to be achieved rapidly
or slowly? This last question can also be phrased in terms of how
much of the burden of past discrimination must be discharged by
the present generation. These are incredibly difficult problems
that are currently being addressed in a fumbling fashion a t the
administrative level with little guidance from the courts and none
from the Supreme Court/'
In any event, more careful analysis would facilitate the proper disposition of cases involving racial classifications. Since the
Court in recent years has not found any racial classificationsMto
be constitutional, one can argue that the issue is not significant.
But as the pressure to recognize some forms of racial classifications, particularly benign classifications, is felt, careful analysis
will be necessary. If the Court is to permit some forms of racial
classification, it must do so on the narrowest possible grounds if
it is not to reverse history and provide constitutional justification
for forms of discrimination now clearly forbidden.

C. Other Suspect Classifications
The language of the equal protection clause gives no basis for
treating some but not other classifications as suspect. The history
of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, supports the conclusion
that the clause was intended to restrict the use of race as a classifying factor. Upon what basis, then, can it be determined whether
other classifying factors should be singled out as constitutionally
suspect?
47. The only significant discussion of any of these problems a t the level of the Supreme Court is found in Justice Douglas' dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
320 (1974). A majority of the Court found the case to be moot and did not reach the merits.
48. The problem most litigated is the difficult threshold issue whether the classification challenged was in fact based on race. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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The answer depends largely on how one reads the basic policies underlying the intent to limit racial classifications. If racial
classifications were made suspect because race is an immutable
and involuntary characteristic of individuals, then the list of classifications potentially subject to being treated as suspect is long.
Sex, height, age, illegitimacy, physical disabilities, and intelligence are all relatively immutable and involuntary characteristics,
yet it is quite clear that at least some of them are commonly used
in legislative classifications. It can be argued, however, that race
is a suspect classification not only because it is an immutable
characteristic but also because it is rarely relevant to a nondiscriminatory legislative purpose. According to this line of reasoning,
sex classifications, for example, would be suspect because they
are often not relevant to a legitimate legislative purpose;%ge
classifications, on the other hand, would not be suspect because
of the many clearly relevant reasons for singling out at least the
very young and the very old for special treatment.
If one asserts, however, that equal protection is intended to
give special protection to members of groups that have suffered
a history of community discrimination" or to members of a "discrete and insular" minority," the problem is more complex. Such
an approach suggests that race classifications should be held invalid only when they burden members of disadvantaged minority
races. With respect to sex, this approach would justify invalidating only classifications burdening females, since only women have
suffered a history of community discrimination, and neither sex
can be said to be a "discrete and insular" minority.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not dearly identified
the basis for its decisions to label some classifications, other than
racial, as "suspect." An examination of those classifications that
have been held suspect or appear likely to be held suspect in the
future will illustrate the problem.
1. Alienage

To date, a majority of the Court has explicitly recognized
only one classification other than race as suspect-alienage. In
Graham v. R i ~ h a r d s o n the
, ~ ~Court held that
49.
50.
51.
52.

See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U S . 677, 686 (1973).
Id. at 684.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U S . 365, 372 (1971).
Id. at 365.
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classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and
insular" minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is a p p r o ~ r i a t e . ~ ~

The Court's analysis suggests that only classifications discriminating against aliens are suspect. Classifications which benefit
aliens and impose burdens on citizens presumably are not suspect.
In many ways, however, the alienage cases do not fit comfortably into the suspect classification mold. While the Court has
invalidated state legislation limiting welfare payments to aliens,54
excluding them from government j o b ~ , ~ h nrefusing
d
to license
them as lawyers," it has recognized that states may deny aliens
the right to vote and to hold an appropriately defined class of
important public positions.57Even the Constitution distinguishes
in many places between aliens and citizens," and the Court has
held that Congress has broad powers to determine which aliens
may immigrate to the United States, the terms and conditions
under which they may remain, and the conditions of their natuinconsistent to hold aliens subject to such a
r a l i z a t i ~ n It
. ~seems
~
wide variety of governmental regulations singling them out for
special treatment, and yet a t the same time hold that alienage
constitutes a suspect classification. Arguably, it would be more
consistent with the constitutional structure for the Court to deal
with these cases under the supremacy clause.60Congress has
broad powers over aliens, and when it determines that they shall
be admitted to permanent residence, state regulations excluding
them from access to a t least the ordinary means of economic
survival in the community can be invalidated as inconsistent
with the congressional determination? In this context, the ap- -

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at%%
Id. a t 383.
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646-48 (1973).
The point is discussed by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Sugarman, id. a t

651.
59. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971).
60. See DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976).
61. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,419 (1948), the Court relied
principally on a federal preclusion argument. Equal protection was mentioned, but the
reference may have related to the fact that the alienage classification also classified by
race. In Graham, federal preclusion was an alternative ground of decision. 403 U.S. 365,
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proach could be similar to that taken under the commerce clause,
wherein state regulation of commerce is invalidated when found
to conflict with an express or implied policy of Congress." Using
a suspect classification approach limited only to certain kinds of
regulations makes it difficult for courts to distinguish in a
principled way alienage classifications that are constitutionally
permissible from those that are not.63
2.

Sex

The latest candidate for inclusion in the list of suspect classifications is sex. Of the six sex-discrimination cases decided in the
past four years, the Court held the legislation invalid in the four
cases in which the classification disadvantaged females,'l but
upheld it in the two cases in which the classification benefitted
females? A majority of the Court asserts that it has not decided
whether sex is a suspect classification; in each case where legislation was found invalid, the Court held that the offending classification did not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
objective. In the latest of these cases, Stanton v. Stanton," the
Court held invalid a Utah law requiring a divorced father to support male children to age 21, but female children only to age 18,
stating:
376-77. The Court also indicated, however, that Congress could not specifically authorize
the states to impose restrictions on aliens because it "does not have the power to authorize
the individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 382. Neither
Sugarman nor Grifiths mentioned the federal preclusion ground, relying wholly on equal
protection.
62. See, e.g. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
63. The Supreme Court will face such a problem this year when it hears Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted 417 U S . 944 (1974), restored
to the calendar for reargument, 420 U.S. 959 (1975). For a discussion of the problems
raised by Hampton see Comment, Aliens and the Federal Government: A Newer Equal
Protection, 8 U.C.D.L. REV.1 (1975).
64. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U S . 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U S . 636
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
The Court did reject a challenge to a state disability insurance system that excluded the
disabilities resulting from normal pregnancy, but analyzed the case as not making a
classification based on sex. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). The Court
said that the legislation, in excluding disability payments to workers for disability resulting from normal pregnancy, divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes
members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to
members of both sexes. For an argument to the contrary see Comment, Pregnancy and
the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF.L. REV. 1532 (1974).
65. Schlesigner v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 499 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U S . 351 (1974).
66. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether a
classification based on sex is inherently suspect. . . .

....

We therefore conclude t h a t under any test-compelling
state interest, or rational basis, or something in between-[the
statute] . . . does not survive an equal protection attackafi7

Despite this rhetoric, it appears that the Court is in fact
treating a t least female sex as a suspect classification. For example, the first of the six sex classification cases, Reed v. Reed," is
most easily explained as a suspect classification case. The legislation established classes of persons entitled to administer the estate of intestates and provided that where several persons were
equally entitled to the right, males must be preferred to females.
The state argued that this classification was justified because it
reduced the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class
of contests. The Court said the question was whether the classification bore "a rational relation to a state objective." It recognized
that reducing workload was an objective of "some legitirna~y,"~~
but instead of determining the question of rational relati~nship,'~
the Court said that:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause. . . .71

This holding suggests t h a t sex is a suspect classification and
therefore invalid. Choice by lot, although equally unrelated to
the ability to administer, would be held valid. Thus, the holding
turns not on the relationship between the classification and the
objective, but instead upon the utilization of a suspect, as opposed to a nonsuspect, classification to achieve the objective.
Since Reed, the Court's opinions have failed to articulate a
satisfactory rationale for the results reached. In the second case
involving a sex classification, Frontiero v. Richardson,72 Justice
Brennan, speaking for a plurality of the Court, argued that sex
67. Id. at 13, 17.
68. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
69. Id. at 76.
70. Presumably, any criteria for selection other than relative merits as an administrator, whether lot, sex, age, residence, or citizenship, would equally relate to the goal of
reducing workload.
71. 404 U.S. at 76 (1971).
72. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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should be treated as a suspect classification. The reasons he gives
for his conclusion, however, appear to support the more limited
position that only those classifications burdening women are suspect. He notes that the country has "had a long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination," but immediately makes it clear
that he means a history of discrimination against
This
history, he says, is one reason for making sex a suspect classification. He goes on to say that because "sex, like race and national
origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth," the imposition of special burdens on members
of a particular sex should be held invalid." He then notes that
what "differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized
suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no
t
relation to ability to perform or contribute to ~ o c i e t y . " ~ B uthis
argument, which would support making all sex classifications
suspect, is confused by his conclusion that statutory distinctions
between the sexes "often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members."'"
The later cases also fail to clarify the Court's rationale. In
' ~ Court upheld legislation granting a special
Kahn v. S h e ~ i n , the
tax exemption for widows. Justice Douglas, who had joined Justice Brennan in his Frontiero opinion, wrote for the Court that no
more than minimal rationality was required because states have
always been given "large leeway" in making tax classification^.^^
Justice White, who had also joined the Brennan opinion in
Frontiero, dissented, arguing in effect that all sex classifications,
not just those discriminating against women, were suspect. Justice Brennan also dissented, arguing that a policy of providing
73. Id. at 684.
74. Id. at 686.
75. Id. (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 687.
77. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
78. Id. at 355. This opinion can almost be taken as holding that male sex is not a
suspect classification. Cf. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 US.656 (1975), holding invalid
a special tax on the incomes of nonresidents as violative of the privileges and immunities
clause. There the Court said that tax classifications are tested by a stricter standard when
a constitutionally protected interest is burdened:
When a tax measure is challenged as an undue burden on an activity granted
special constitutional recognition, however, the appropriate degree of inquiry is
that necessary to protect the competing constitutional value from erosion.
Id. at 662.
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special benefits for needy women who had been subject to a history "of purposeful discrimination and neglect" was proper, but
said that the statute should be held invalid because it extended
the protection to all widows rather than just to needy widows.79
In Schlesinger v. Ballard,80the Court upheld a military regulation allowing women line officers to avoid mandatory discharge
for a longer period of service in one rank without promotion t h a ~
the period allowed for men. A majority of the Court upheld the
regulation as rationally related to the problem that women had
fewer opportunities for advancement because they were not eligible for combat missions or sea duty. Justice Brennan, in dissent,
examined the legislation and determined that the purpose of the
legislation could not have been compensatory. He therefore concluded that a permissible basis for the discrimination did not
exist
, ~ ~Court held invalid a secIn Weinberger v. W i e ~ e n f e l dthe
tion of the Social Security Act that provided that benefits based
on the death of a covered wife were payable only to her children,
while benefits based on the death of a covered husband were
payable to his surviving spouse as well as the children. Justice
Brennan, speaking for the Court, recognized that there was empirical support for the conclusion that men are more likely than
women to be primary supporters of their spouses and children,
but said that "such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice
to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and
whose earnings contribute significantly to their families' supp~rt."~%gain,he seems to say that sex is a suspect classification,
but uses language suggesting that it is the "denigration of the
efforts of women" which is the basis for the result.
Finally, in Stanton v. Stant~n,~"heCourt held that a state
could not require parental support obligations to males until age
21 but to females only until age 18. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether classifications based on sex are suspect;
rather, it opted to follow the Reed holding that to be valid a
classification must be reasonable and rest upon a ground or difference substantially related to the object of the legislation.
Applying this standard, the Court rejected an attempt to justify
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974).
419 U.S. 499 (1975).
Id. at 520.
420 U.S. 636 (1975).
Id. at 645.
421 U.S. 7 (1975).

106

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

the distinction on the ground that education was more necessary
for boys, who had the responsibility to provide a home. The Court
asserted that such a distinction reflected "the role-typing society
has long imposed" on women.85
One can debate whether there is a principled basis for finding
sex classifications to be suspect under equal p r o t e c t i ~ n .Cer~~
tainly elimination of sex bias was not one of the purposes of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment?' The second section of
the amendment recognized a right to restrict voting to males,xx
and it took the Nineteenth Amendment to eliminate sex as a
qualification for voting. Yet it can be argued that in important
respects women have suffered a history of community discrimination that, by analogy to the situation of minority races, justifies
making a t least female sex a suspect classification. Such a limitation to female sex fits closely with what the Court has been doing,
if not with what it has been saying. If this is the appropriate
analysis, then the most significant difference between equal protection and the proposed Equal Rights AmendmentRgmay be that
---

-

-

85. Id. a t 15.
86. For an excellent and balanced discussion see Ginsburg, Gender and the
Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV.1 (1975).
Frequently this question and similar ones are answered in terms which suggest that
it is the duty of courts to eliminate all bad or unwise legislation. See, e.g., Johnson, Sex
L)iscrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.617 (1974):
Remedies [for those seeking gender equality] are available, if judges can
only be persuaded to use them. It is an awesome task to convince a comfortable
and overwhelmingly male judiciary that the existing pattern of legally-enforced
sex discrimination is so pernicious as to violate the federal Constitution. The
effort is gathering momentum, as increasing numbers of judges join those who
have already recognized this anachronistic culture excrescence for what it is:
stupid, wasteful and morally reprehensible.

....
Suppression of the efforts of people to lead independent lives is not among
the legitimate powers of government. In our system, responsibility for the ultimate vindication of this truth lies with the courts. In the area of sex discrimination, the recent performance of the Supreme Court has ranged from acceptable
to inexcusably poor.
Id. a t 691-92.
OF SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION
2 (1974).
CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPECTS
87. See R. GINSBURG,
88. The section provided for a reduction of representation in Congress to states which
denied the right to vote "to any of the male inhabitants of such State" who were 21 and
citizens.
89. SENATE
COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY,
EQUAL
RIGHTS
FORMENAND WOMEN,
S. REP.NO.
689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972). Section 1 would provide: "Equality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex." For a discussion of the amendment and its background with references to the already
extensive literature see R. GINSBURG,
CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPECTSOF SEX-BASED
107 (1974).
D~SCH~M~NATION
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the latter, if adopted, will make sex, rather than female sex, a
suspect, if not virtually forbidden, classification. In any event,
the area could be clarified if the Court would face the issue directly. An explicit determination of the basis for categorizing sex
as a suspect classification is essential to a rational and consistent
determination of the question of whether laws favoring females
are to be upheld.
3. Illegitimacy

The Supreme Court has invalidated classifications based on
illegitimacy in a number of recent cases. In each case the Court
has purported to apply the general limitation that a classification
is invalid if not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
But here, as in the sex cases, the results, as opposed to the rhetoric, of the decisions are consistent with the theory that illegitimacy is a suspect classification. In six of the seven cases before
~ "basis for this
it, the Court has held the classification i n ~ a l i d . A
result is difficult to derive from the Constitution, however, since
legal preferences for legitimate children, reflecting religious and
social preferences for traditional family relationships, have a long
tradition in our law.91Moreover, some language in these opinions
suggests that the Court may be in the process of extending constitutional protection to a particular interest rather than making the
classification suspect. Thus, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety C O .the
~ ~Court said that imposing
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the
bonds of marriage. . . . [on] the head of an infant is illogical
and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wr~ngdoing.~"

Again, it would seem that needed clarity would be given this area
of the law if the Court would directly confront the question of
whether it is using equal protection to create a suspect classifica90. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U S . 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U S . 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U S . 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U S . 68 (1968); Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). A restriction on inheritance b y illegitimates was upheld in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
91. H. KRAUSE,
ILLEGITIMACY:
LAWAND SOCIAL
POLICY1 (1971).
92. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
93. Id. a t 175 (footnote omitted).
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tion, or finding elsewhere in ihe Constitution protection for the
interest not to be subjected to legal burdens which do not relate
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
4.

Wealth

Despite the Court's assertion in Harper v. Virginia Board of
ElectionsY4that "[llines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race . . . are traditionally disfavored," the
Court has yet to determine that classifications based on wealth
are suspect and therefore subject to special scrutiny. In San AntoCourt noted
nio Independent School District v. Rodrigue~,~Vhe
that it had "never heretofore held that wealth discrimination
alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny
. . . ."YWoris it likely that the Court will move in that direction
since the great bulk of legislation bears differently on individuals
in relation to their economic status. The Court properly realizes
that wealth classifications can be challenged only if they impose
burdens on interests which are protected by the Constitution.
5.

Other Classifications

The question remaining is whether the Court will categorize
other classifications based on personal characteristics as constitutionally suspect. It seems likely that the answer to this question
is no. Classifications based on age (e.g., laws relating to juveniles,
compulsory retirement laws, old-age benefits), educational background, marital status, and other characteristics of individuals
are so common that judicial scrutiny based solely on the nature
of the classification seems both inappropriate and unlikely.
111. CLASSIFICATIONS
BURDENING
CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED

INTERESTS
A.

The Scope of the Doctrine

A second aspect of modern equal protection doctrine holds
that classifications violate the equal protection clause if they burden constitutionally protected individual interests and are not
closely related to "compelling" state interests. If a complainant
shows that a classification "serves to penalize the exercise" of a
94. 383 U S . 663, 668 (1966).
95. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
96. Id. at 29. See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U S . 656, 660 (1973).
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constitutional "right," the state must show that the classification
is "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest" or
it will be held invalid.97The concern in these cases is not with the
classifying factor, but rather with the importance of the state
interest asserted and the closeness of the relationship between the
classification and that interest. Initially, one wonders why it is
necessary to utilize equal protection at all when the interest is
independently protected by the Constitution. If the legislation is
inconsistent with the constitutional protection already accorded
the interest, is it not invalid without need for reference to equal
protection? Is equal protection simply irrelevant or does it extend
some additional protection? If so, what protection and why?
When the Supreme Court tests legislation alleged to be inconsistent with the constitutional protection accorded to a particular interest, it applies two general rules. First, legislation that
discriminates against constitutionally protected interests will
normally be held invalid? In some cases, the Court reaches this
result simply by applying the underlying constitutional provision.!" In other cases, it asserts that it is a denial of equal protection to single out a constitutionally protected interest for discriminatory treatment.'" The most difficult task in this area is to
determine when, if ever, such discriminatory legislation should be
upheld. In theory, it seems that legislation discriminating against
a constitutionally protected interest should be upheld only where
the particular application of the interest involved would uniquely
harm an important governmental interest? Some of the cases do
97. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
98. The fact that discriminatory burdens placed on constitutionally protected interests will be held invalid, even though the same burdens might not be invalid if imposed
generally, is best illustrated by a series of tax cases. The Court holds that tax classifications generally are presumed constitutional. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (upholding statute imposing tax on personal property of corporations but not of individuals). Yet it holds invalid taxes that discriminate against interstate
commerce, Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S 389 (1952); against foreign corporations which have been admitted to do local business, Whyy v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117
(1968); against the press, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); and against
citizens of other states, Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
99. See, E.g.,Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
100. See, e.g., such First Amendment cases as Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
101 (1972); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951); see also Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV.233, 272 [hereinafter cited as Stone];
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. C H I .L. REV.20
(1975).
101. The privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2 is given such a reading with
respect to the rights of the citizens of one state in another:
[The clause] does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that
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talk about upholding such legislation when it is "tailored to
[serve] a substantial governmental interest,"'" but cases actually upholding such discrimination are rare.Io3
The second general rule used in this analysis is that even
where legislation does not discriminate against a constitutionally
protected interest, if it burdens such an interest so as to be inconsistent with the constitutional protection accorded the interest,
the legislation is invalid. Application of this principle frequently
entails a weighing process, that is, determining whether the state
interest asserted is sufficiently important to justify the particular
burden on the protected interest.lo4In this context, the Court
often simply states that if the governmental interest is sufficiently substantial to justify the burden, then the standard for
testing the particular relationship is only that of reasonableness.
In a First Amendment case, for example, the Court has said: "A
State or municipality may protect individual privacy [the governmental interest] by enacting reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content. "10"
Use of equal protection in lieu of applying directly the constitutional provision protecting an interest significantly changes
the focus of the analysis. Where legislation discriminates against
a constitutionally protected interest, equal protection analysis
is irrelevant. If it has any impact, it may be to weaken the protection normally accorded to the constitutional interest inthey are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment
in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for
it. Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons
do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them.
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (footnote omitted); cf. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (invaliding residence
requirement for abortions).
102. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972).
103. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) may be one of those exceptions.
See the discussion in Stone, supra note 100, a t 275-80.
104. Balancing is done most overtly in commerce clause cases. See, e.g., Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). A dispute raged for years in the Supreme Court
over whether balancing of interests was appropriate in First Amendment cases. For a
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
useful survey of that dispute see G. GUNTHER,
CASESAND MATERIALS
LAW1049-54 (9th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER].
At any rate, there is little
doubt that a recurrent theme in First Amendment cases is one of balancing the competing
interests.
105. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); see Stone, supra note 100,
a t 275-80; cf. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (where the balancing may
have been misplaced).
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volved.lo6In the case of legislation that burdens, but does not
discriminate against the protected interest, equal protection
analysis utilizing the compelling state interest standard appears
to extend greater protection than would be accorded simply by
applying the substantive constitutional restraint. The Court uses
the existence of a burden on the constitutionally protected interest to require the classification to meet the compelling state interest test without significant concern for the seriousness of that
burden. Thus, a regulation which imposes even a minor burden
on a protected interest may be held to require the state to show
that it has a compelling state interest and that the classification
is closely related to that interest. The result is to shift attention
away from determining the scope of the constitutional protection
accorded the interest and toward simply evaluating the magnitude of the state's interest and the closeness of the relationship
between the classification and that interest. That this shift in
attention changes the result is suggested.by the fact that whenever the Court has applied the standard of close relationship to a
compelling state interest it has held the legislation invalid.'"
At an earlier stage, it appeared that the Court was going to
extend this compelling state interest test to classifications that
burdened "fundamental" or important interests not expressly
protected in the text of the Constitution. For example, the Court
held that although the Constitution did not establish a "right to
vote" in state elections, regulations imposing restrictions on voting would violate equal protection unless shown to be closely
related to a compelling state interest.'" Advocates urged the
Court to extend this reasoning to hold that interests such as those
in welfare and education were sufficiently fundamental to require
that classifications burdening them be justified as closely related
to a compelling state interest.'" Had the Court done so, it is
apparent that it would have been, in effect, extending substan106. Cf. note 143 and accompanying text infra.
107. Two cases dealing with the regulation of elections appear to be the major exceptions. American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
In Storer, the Court appeared to apply a diluted version of the test by requiring that the
state have a compelling interest, but that the classification need be only reasonably
related to it. Id. a t 736. See also Buckley v. Valco, 96 S. Ct. 612, 670-72 (1976).
108. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621,627-30 (1969). The point
and the cases are discussed in more detail in the next portion of the article.
109. The strategy on welfare is discussed in Sparer, The Right to Welfare in THE
RIGHTSOF AMERICANS-WHAT
THEY ARE-WHATTHEYSHOULD
BE 65 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973), it was argued that
education is a fundamental right which requires the application of the compelling state
interest doctrine to classifications burdening it.
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tive constitutional protection to those interests under the guise of
equal protection. In S a n Antonio Independent School District u.
Rodriguez,Ilo however, the Court refused to take this step.
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is
"fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or
housing. Nor is it to be found in weighing whether education is
as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."'

The initial development of the doctrine that equal protection
compelled strict scrutiny of classifications that burdened constitutionally protected interests came in the voting and election
cases. The history of that development will be examined first,
followed by a review of the cases dealing with other constitutionally protected interests.

B.

Cases Relating to Voting and Elections

The Constitution as originally adopted authorized the states
to establish the qualifications for voting-even for voting for
members of Congress.It2 But a series of amendments has restricted that state power. The Fifteenth Amendment forbids
abridging the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude;" the Nineteenth Amendment, "on account of sex." The Twenty-fourth Amendment provides that the
right to vote for federal officers shall not be denied or abridged
for the "failure to pay any poll tax or other tax," and the Twentysixth Amendment provides that the right of citizens 18 years of
age or older to vote in federal or state elections shall not be denied
or abridged "on account of age."
As late as 1959, the Court, in upholding a state literacy test
for voting, said, "The States have long been held to have broad
powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised . . . absent of course the discrimination
which the Constitution condemns,"113but added:
110. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
111. Id. at 33-34.
112. U.S. CONST.art. I,

5 2; see Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote:
Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 SUP. CT. REV.1, 3 [hereinafter cited as Casper].
113. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959).
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We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires
to adopt may be required of voters. But there is a wide scope
for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age,
[and] previous criminal record . . . are obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in
determining the qualifications of voters.*I4

Four years later the Court began the process of limiting these
broad state powers. In Gray u. Sanders,Ils invalidating the Georgia county-unit system of voting, and Reynolds v. Sirn~,~l"equiring numerical equality for legislative districts, the Court recognized the power of the states to set general qualifications for
voting, but held that all citizens possessing those qualifications
are constitutionally entitled to vote and to have their votes
counted and weighed equally with those cast by other citizens. In
Gray the Court referred to such general concepts as the phrase
"we the people"l17 in the preamble to the Constitution, and the
"conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, SevReynolds, the
enteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments."ll"n
Court stated that the "right to vote freely for the candidate of
one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike a t the heart of representative
government."llg But instead of directly constructing a constitutionally protected right to vote out of those materials, the Court
in each case held that the equal protection clause forbade any
dilution or debasement of the "right to vote."
Soon after Gray and Reynolds, the Court proceeded to use
the equal protection clause to restrict the authority of the states
to impose certain qualifications on voting. Restrictions based on
military service,120payment of poll taxes,I2l real property owner114. Id. a t 51.
115. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
116. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
117. 372 U.S. a t 380.
118. Id. a t 381.
119. 377 U.S. a t 555.
120. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Again the Court spoke broadly of "matters close to the core of our constitutional system," but ultimately held that the limitation
constituted an "invidious discrimination" in violation of equal protection. Id. at 96.
121. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).The Court ignored
the constitutional history created by the adoption of the Twenty-fourth Amendment
proscribing the use of poll taxes in voting for federal officers. The Court appeared to derive
from equal protection the principle that the power of the states to set qualifications is
limited to qualifications germane to the voter's "ability to participate intelligently in the
electoral process." Id. a t 668.
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ship,ln and duration of residence123were invalidated because the
states had not shown that they were closely related to a compelling state
The Court's mode of analysis is best illustrated by Kramer u. Union Free School District No. 15.1294statute which provided that only otherwise qualified voters who were
either parents of children or owners or lessors of real property
could vote in school district elections was held violative of equal
protection. The Court said that " 'any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized' . . . because statutes distributing the franchise constitute
the foundation of our representative society."12' Although this
language might be taken as establishing a constitutionally protected interest in voting, the Court went on to say that the constitutional protection accorded by equal protection is limited to
legislation which "grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to
others. "I2' The Court further indicated that such legislation is
valid only if "the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest."12R
It would be difficult for the Court to read into the Constitution a constitutionally protected interest in ~ 0 t i n g . In
I ~this
~ area,
122. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
123. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.330 (1972).
124. The doctrine was also applied in the apportionment cases which are not reviewed
here. See generally, Casper, supra note 112; Developments in the Law-Elections, 88
HAW. L. REV.1111 (1975).
125. 395 U S . 621 (1969).
126. Id. at 626.
127. Id. at 627.
128. Id.
For an excellent discussion of the Kramer case see Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the
Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 15 ARIZ.L. REV.457
(1973).
129. The Court's difficulty was highlighted in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court's holding that only interests explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution called for strict scrutiny of classifications burdening
them required an explanation of the voting cases. The Court said in a footnote: "The
constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process can no
longer be doubted even though . . . 'the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.' " Id. a t 34 n.74. Later the Court noted that "the right to vote, per se,
is not a constitutionally protected right . . . ." Id. a t 35 n.78. Justice Stewart, concurring,
said that if there were a right to vote "both the Fifteenth Amendment and the Nineteenth
Amendment would have been wholly unnecessary." Id. a t 59 n.2. Justice Marshall, dissenting, asked: "I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees . . . the right to
vote in state elections . . . ." The voting cases and some others were, he said,
instances in which, due to the importance of the interests a t stake, the Court
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more than in almost any other, the people have spoken through
piecemeal amendments to the Constitution itself. Hence, one can
understand the reluctance of the Court to find in equal protection
a general ban on state-imposed qualifications despite its view
that the "right to vote" is "of the essence of a democratic society"I3" and that "statutes distributing the franchise constitute
the foundation of our representative society."131
According the interest in voting partial or indirect protection
through equal protection is an unsatisfactory solution, however,
because it focuses attention on the importance of the state's interest and the relationship of the classification to that interest rather
than on the relationship between the burden imposed on the interest in voting and the state interest. The problem is illustrated
by the most recent voting case, Hill u. Stone.132There the Court
had before it a statute providing that to qualify to vote in city
bond elections one must have "rendered" (listed) any real or
personal property he might own with the assessor for taxation.
The burden imposed was not large since any amount of property
was sufficient to qualify the voter if it was listed, whether or not
any tax was in fact paid. The state suggested that the purposes
of the requirement were, first, to extend some protection to property owners who would bear the direct burden of retiring the
bonded indebtedness and, second, to facilitate enforcement of the
tax laws. The Court focused its examination on the relationship
of the classification to the state interests asserted. I t said that if
the classification meant that anyone owning property even of
minimal value could vote, then it would not serve either the interest of selecting voters in relation to their prospective liability for
the bonded indebtedness or that of enforcing the state tax laws.
But had the Court sought to determine whether the statute violated a constitutionally protected interest in voting, it would have
more directly emphasized the balance between the magnitude of
the burden and the importance of the state interest. Under such
an analysis, acceptance of the state's argument that the impact
on access to the franchise was minimal could result in the conclusion that the legislation need only be a reasonable means of satishas displayed a strong concern with the existence of discriminatory state treatment. But the Court has never said or indicated that these are interests which
independently enjoy full-blown constitutional protection.
Id. a t 100.
130. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
131. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
132. 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
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fying a legitimate but not necessarily "compelling" state interest.
Thus, the state interest might not need to be so important nor the
classification so closely related as under the Court's equal protection analysis.
In conclusion, application of the Constitution to regulations
relating to voting and elections would be greatly facilitated if,
either by judicial construction or constitutional amendment, direct constitutional protection were given to the interest in participating in the electoral process.
C.

Cases Relating to Travel and Interstate Migration

The first case in which the Court clearly articulated the doctrine that equal protection requires application of the compelling
state interest standard to classifications burdening constitutionally protected interests involved the interest in freedom of travel.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,133the Court invalidated a law requiring
a year's residence in the state to qualify for welfare payments.
The Court reasoned that the Constitution requires "that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our
land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."134The legislative classification burdening recent residents could not be justified as a
means of discouraging indigents from entering the state to obtain
larger benefits since that purpose is inconsistent with the interest
in freedom of travel. Other justifications advanced by the state,
relating largely to administrative problems and the detection of
fraud, were held insufficient since the classification was not
closely enough related to the state's purposes. The Court said
that a mere rational relationship was not enough:
[I]n moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia
appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is u n c o n ~ t i t u t i o n a l . ~ ~ ~

Significantly, the Court did not discuss the extent of the burden
placed on the interest in freedom of travel or relate that burden
to the state interests involved.
133. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
134. Id. at 629. For a recent review of the background and development of the "right
to travel" see Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A.L.REV.1129
(1975).
135. 394 U S . at 634 (1969).
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In Dunn v. B l u r n ~ t e i nthe
, ~ ~Court,
~
in holding invalid a durational residence requirement for voting, elaborated on the test to
be applied. First, the Court said that it is not necessary to show
that the classification actually deterred travel; the "compellingstate-interest test" would be triggered by any classification which
serves to penalize the exercise of the "right" to travel. Next, i t
said that the "right" to travel is an unconditional personal right,
the exercise of which may not be conditioned absent a compelling
state interest. Finally, in rejecting as insufficient the state interests asserted, the Court elaborated on the nature of the compelling state interest test:
It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational
residence requirements further a very substantial state interest.
In pursuing that important interest, the State cannot choose
means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally
protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must
be drawn with "precision," . . . and must be "tailored" to serve
their legitimate 0bje~tives.l~~

The Court was saying that even a minor burden on the interest
in travel required the state to show both that it had a compelling
interest and that the classification waslso closely related to that
objective that it was the least burdensome method available.
Both Shapiro and Dunn are consistent with a more direct
approach that makes unnecessary the use of equal protection
analysis. In each, the Court recognized a constitutionally protected interest. I t referred to the interest as the interest in freedom of travel, but apparently only the narrower interest in freedom of interstate migration was in~olved.'~"n each, the burden
was placed only on persons who had recently migrated. Therefore,
the statutes could easily have been held invalid because they
discriminated against the exercise of a constitutionally protected
interest, and such discrimination could not be justified since the
recent residents, as such, did not present any unique evil. In
136. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
137. Id. at 343 (citation omitted).
138. The Court recognized this in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U .S. 250,
(1974):
[Tjhe right to travel was involved in only a limited sense in Shapiro. The Court
was there concerned only with the right to migrate, "with intent to settle and
abide" or, as the Court put it, "to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a
new life."
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Dunn, the Court directly articulated this notion: "Durational residence laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to
travel by imposing their prohibitions only on those persons who
have recently exercised that right."139But then, as in Shapiro, the
Court confused the issue by suggesting that such discriminatory
legislation might be upheld if necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.
The confusion introduced by this unnecessary suggestion,
that a discriminatory law burdening the exercise of a constitutionally protected interest can be upheld if necessary to satisfy a
compelling state interest, was underscored in Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County. 140 In Shapiro and Dunn it was reasonably
clear t h a t when the Court referred to durational residence requirements as penalizing the interest in travel, it meant that the
requirements discriminated against the exercise of the interest-that is, imposed the burden only on those who had recently
migrated. But in Memorial Hospital, the Court explained the
notion of penalty in another way. It said that in Shapiro "the
Court found denial of the basic 'necessities of life' to be a penalty."lU Accordingly, the Court indicated that a durational residence requirement for lower college tuition would be valid, even
though it was discriminatory and burdened the exercise of the
interest in migration, since the interest in attending college was
not as vital as the interest in welfare in Shapiro or medical care
in Memorial Hospital.142This is indeed a strange result: to hold
that the validity of discriminatory classifications burdening the
exercise of constitutionally protected interests depends on
whether or not the classifications burden other interests which are
not constitutionally protected.
The confusion thus introduced led the Court to uphold a
139. 405 U.S. a t 342 (footnote omitted). See also McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
Service Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 1154 (1976) (holding that a requirement that city employees
reside in the city did not violate the "right" to travel).
140. 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974). There the Court held invalid a state statute requiring
a year's residence in a county as a condition to receiving nonemergency hospitalization or
medical care at county expense. Its search for a basis other than discrimination may be
explained by the fact that the restriction was upon recent residents coming from other
counties in the state as well as from outside the state. I t still should be possible, however,
to interpret the statute as discriminating against migration. The recent resident who had
come from another state was treated differently than persons who had resided longer in
the county. The fact that recent residents coming from other counties in the state were
similarly treated should be irrelevant to the issue.
141. 415 U S . a t 259.
142. The Court was also reacting to dictum in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S . 441, 452
(1973) suggesting that lower resident tuition fees in state educational institutions could
be conditioned on durational residence requirements.
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durational residence requirement for divorce in Sosna v. Iowa.I4"
The complainant argued that the statute was invalid because "it
establishes two classes of persons and discriminates against those
who have recently exercised their right to travel . . . ."I4' Based
on such precedents as Dunn, Shapiro, and Memorial Hospital, it
appears that this argument should have been decisive unless the
state could show that, with respect to determining the crucial
jurisdictional issue of residence, the recent resident presented
problems not presented by other residents. The Court, however,
rejected the argument and proceeded to decide the case as though
it involved a nondiscriminatory burden on the exercise of the
interest in freedom of migration. Using the notions developed in
Memorial Hospital, the Court said that the burden on the complainant was not as heavy as in the cases involving welfare, voting, or medical care since she was not irretrievably foreclosed
from obtaining some part of what she sought-by waiting she
could obtain the same divorce decree sought upon her arrival in
the state. Against this lower burden on the interest, the Court
said, must be weighed the more substantial state interests in
insuring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the state, and in insulating divorce decrees from
collateral attack. Significantly, the Court spoke neither of compelling state interests nor of the requirement that the classifications be closely tailored to such state interests.
Sosna leaves this area of the law in a state of complete confusion-a confusion created mainly by the use of equal protection
analysis in cases where it is neither necessary nor proper. In
Sosna, equal protection analysis led the Court to uphold a discriminatory classification burdening the exercise of a constitutionally protected interest without recognizing the general approach in other areas that holds such discrimination unconstitutional whatever the extent of the burdens imposed. Further, the
Court appeared to reject the notion that nondiscriminatory statutes burdening the exercise of constitutionally protected interests
are invalid, whatever the extent of the burden, unless closely
related to a compelling state interest. Instead, the Court balanced
the extent of the burden on the interest in migration against the
state interests asserted in much the same manner as it does, for
143. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
144. Id. at 405.
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example, in First Amendment cases where the burden is not discriminatory. 14"
Here, as in the voting cases, both clarity of analysis and
consistency in result would be achieved if the Court abandoned
the use of equal protection and decided the cases by determining
whether the particular legislation conflicts with the constitutionally protected interest in freedom of migration. On this basis,
most, if not all, durational residence requirements would be
found invalid as discriminatory burdens upon the exercise of that
interest.

D. Cases Relating to Other Constitutionally Protected Interests
To date, the Court has applied equal protection analysis to
hold classifications burdening the exercise of constitutionally protected interests invalid, unless closely related to compelling state
interests, only in cases involving voting, elections, and durational
residence requirements. Whether the Court will discover other
constitutionally protected interests to which it will apply the rule
remains to be seen.
It is worth noting, however, that the Court has recently been
establishing the contours of a constitutionally protected interest
in privacy without using the equal protection clause. In a series
of cases, the Court has held that the interest in privacy is a
"liberty" protected by the due process clause.lq6The cases have
focused on the scope of the protection accorded rather than on the
classifications and their relationships to the state interests involved. Nevertheless, the Court has borrowed an approach from
the equal protection cases. In Roe u. Wade,14' for example, the
Court analyzed whether forbidding abortions unconstitutionally
interfered with the interest in privacy as follows: (1)There is a
145. For an argument that the right to travel should be unhinged from equal protection in order to broaden its scope see Note, Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use
Regulations, 84 YALEL.J. 1564 (1975). For an alternate method to analyze these cases,
see the suggestion that "newcomers" be regarded as a suspect class in McCoy, Recent
Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect
Class? 28 VAND.L. REV.987 (19%).
146. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Discussion of the constitutional basis and the
scope of the interest in privacy is beyond the scope of this article. The literature on the
subject is already enormous. For a useful review of cases and articles see GUNTHER,
supra
note 104, a t 616-56.
147. 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973).
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constitutionally protected interest in privacy. (2) That interest is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her
of the significant detriment that would be
pregnancy because14R
imposed on her by denying her the choice. (3) Since the legislation burdens the exercise of this interest in privacy, it can be
sustained only if it is justified by compelling state interests and
the legislation is narrowly drawn to express only those interests.
All of this terminology may be no more than an elaborate
way of saying that the validity of a statute burdening the interest
in privacy is determined by weighing the extent of the burden
against the importance of the state interests. If so, the language
changes nothing.ld9It may, however, suggest a more mechanical
approach: if the interest in privacy is burdened, whether substantially or not, the regulation must be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Such an interpretation would tend to extend to the interest in privacy a measure of protection greater
than that normally accorded other constitutionally protected interests.
The most recent case, Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,lMsuggests that the Court may not be departing from the
normal mode of weighing the state interest against the burden on
the interest in privacy. In holding invalid mandatory maternity
leave regulations for pregnant teachers the Court referred to the
"heavy burden" imposed on the protected interest. Instead of
speaking in terms of a compelling state interest, it said that the
"rules must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge
upon this vital area of a teacher's constitutional 1iberty."l5l
148. It is not entirely clear that the word "because" is correct. The Court may have
been simply asserting that the "right to privacy" included the freedom to have an abortion. See id. a t 153.
149. As long ago as Sherber v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), the Court, after
finding that a statute burdened freedom of religion, said that the question was "whether
some compelling state interest . . . justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's
First Amendment rights."
150. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See also the discussion of privacy in Paul v. Davis, 96 S.
Ct. 1155, 1166 (1976).
151. Id. at 640. This article does not discuss the recent series of cases holding that
legislation which creates "permanent irrebuttable presumptions" is subject to strict scrutiny under due process. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). It can be argued that these cases should be analyzed
as equal protection cases because the emphasis is upon the accuracy of the classification.
L. REV.
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV.
1534 (1974). But in any event, it appears that this basis for selecting certain regulations
for strict scrutiny is about to be abandoned by the Court. See the long discussion of the
issue by the Court in rejecting its application to a social security provision in Weinberger
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). But cf. Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 96 S. Ct. 249
(1975).

122

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

IV. FREEDOM
FROM IRRATIONAL
CLASSIFICATIONS

A. Introduction
The preceding portions of this article have discussed the application of equal protection to cases where the basis for classification is found to be constitutionally proscribed or suspect, and
to cases where the classification burdens a constitutionally protected interest. The question now to be addressed is to what
extent the equal protection clause also imposes on legislation a
requirement that classifications be reasonably related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Does the clause extend constitutional
protection to an interest in freedom from arbitrary or irrational
classifications? If so, what is the scope of that protection?
The analytical problems involved in answering such quesSuppose that a legislature enacts a law
tions are f0rmidab1e.l~~
with a preamble expressing its concern with the rising accident
and death rate on the highways, and an operational section imposing a one-year suspension from driving for any person who has
been twice convicted within a two-year period of either driving in
excess of the speed limit or reckless driving. Obviously, this classification is both underinclusive and over-inclusive with regard to
the legislative purpose. I t will not impose suspensions on many
drivers whose performance on the highways contributes to the
accident rate and it will suspend some drivers who do not contribute to that rate. How does one decide whether classifications of
this kind are forbidden by the constitutional interest in freedom
from irrational classifications?
One can say that here, as with other constitutionally protected interests, the courts should balance the state interest in152. A major problem not discussed here is that of determining what legislative
objective is to be utilized in testing classifications. See the excellent discussion of the
L.J. 123
problem in Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE
(1972). The author notes:
It is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in such a way
that the statutory classification is rationally related to it. When a statute names
a class, that class must share some common characteristic for that is the definitional attribute of a "class." The nature of the burdens or benefits created by a
statute and the nature of the chosen class's commonality will always suggest a
statutory purpose-to so burden or benefit the common trait shared by members
of the identified class. A statute's classifications will be rationally related to
such a purpose because the reach of the purpose has been derived from the
classifications themselves.
Id. a t 128 (footnotes omitted). The author concludes that courts "do not in fact use the
rationality requirement to strike down statutes, because it is impossible to do so." Id. at
154.
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volved against the interest in freedom from irrational classifications. How should that balance be struck, or the balancing model
constructed? There are a t least five possibilities. The Court could
balance (1)the level of irrationality of the legislation-the extent
to which the classification departs from perfect correlation with
the legislative purpose-against the state interest in maintaining
the normal political processes in our democratic society (which
necessarily produce less-than-perfect classifications); (2) the
level of irrationality against the state interest in economy and
efficiency achieved by making the particular classifications; (3)
the level of irrationality against the nature and extent of the
burden on the individual affected by the classification (e.g., if the
individual is imprisoned or denied welfare or education, the classifications would have to be more rational than if his business
were made less profitable or his property less valuable); (4) the
level of irrationality against the invidiousness of the basis upon
which the classification is drawn (e.g., a classification based on
lack of wealth would have to be more rational than one based on
ability to pass a driving test); and (5) the importance of the state
interest being served by the legislation against the nature and
extent of the burden on the individual, or the relative "invidiousness" of the classification.

B. Level of Irrationality v. State Interest in Maintenance of
Normal Political Processes
Equal protection has a minimal impact when the balance is
between the level of irrationality and the state interest in maintaining the normal political processes. Under this analysis, almost all legislation is upheld. Posner has recently presented the
argument for this position,lJ3asserting that the legislative process
does not attempt to promote some general conception of the public good:
Many public policies are better explained as the outcome of a
pure power struggle-clothed in a rhetoric of public interest that
is a mere figleaf-among narrow interest or pressure groups. The
ability of such groups to obtain legislation derives from their
money, votes, cohesiveness, ability to make credible threats of
violence or other disorder if their demands are not met, and
other factors all totally unrelated to the abstract merit of the
policy at issue.i54
153. Posner, supra note 39, at 27-28.
154. Id. at 27.
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From this he concludes that it is a mistake to require as a constitutional standard
that legislation, to withstand a challenge based on alleged arbitrariness or discrimination, be reasonably related to some general social goal. The real "justification" for most legislation is
simply that it is the product of the constitutionally created political process of our s 0 ~ i e t y . l ~ ~

Tussman and t e n B r ~ e k , Iin
~ ~their pioneering article a
quarter of a century ago, took the opposite approach. They recognized that political considerations result in legislative classifications that are not closely related to a general legislative objective
because of the necessity to accommodate the conflicting interests
of various groups:
If we accept the pressure group theory, a law is properly the
resultant of pressures exerted by competing interests . . . . The
demand for equal laws becomes meaningless in this context.
The legislature, on this view, is simply the focal point of competing forces-a social barometer faithfully registering pressures.
Can the Court demand of a barometer that it ignore pressure?157

Nevertheless, they asserted that the constitutional protection of
equal laws is a constitutional command that the legislatures rise
above such pressures and serve the general good, and that "the
triumph of private or group pressure marks the corruption of the
legislative process." Hence, they concluded that "legislative submission to political pressure does not constitute a fair reason for
failure to extend the operation of a law to those similarly situated
whom it leaves untouched."158
It appears that the Court follows the Posner approach with
respect to most legislation challenged under the equal protection
the Court
clause. In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New Y0r12,l~~
said that it is by "practical considerations based on experience
rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of
equal protection is to be answered." In McGowan u. Maryland,16o
155. Id. at 28-29. Posner does suggest that there may be "extreme cases of discriminatory state action" which are so "palpably inconsistent" with equal protection as to be
unconstitutional, "such as forbidding left-handed people to obtain drivers' licenses in
order to reduce automobile pollution." Id. at 29 n.56.
156. Tussman & tenBroek, The Eqwll Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.L. REV.341
(1949).
157. Id. at 350.
158. Id.
159. 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
160. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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the Court said that the states are permitted
[a] wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some
groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws
result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.I6l

Thus, the Court strikes down few classifications as irrational because it could do so
only if we substituted our judgment on the facts of which we can
be only dimly aware for a legislative judgment that reflects a
vivid reaction to pressing fiscal problems. . . . We cannot [do
this] and stay within the narrow confines of judicial review,
which is an important part of our constitutional tradition.I6*

C. Level of Irrationality v. State Interest i n Economy and
Eficiency
The second possibility, that the level of irrationality should
be balanced against the state interest in economy and efficiency
in government, is closely related to the first. The emphasis here
is on the relative costs of attempting to classify people by characteristics closely related to the legislative purpose, as opposed to
using a less rational but more easily applied classification. Thus,
a state could justify a requirement that one pass a bar examination to practice law, although the process will exclude some who
would make good lawyers and include some who would not, since
means more closely related to individual fitness are much more
expensive and introduce greater possibilities of individual judgments based on inadmissible factors.
The Court has recently used this approach to limit the line
of cases holding that statutes making conclusive presumptions
161. Id. at 425-26. This same approach will be found in a number of more recent
cases. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U S . 1 (1974); North Dakota State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores Inc., 414 U S . 156 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U S . 356 (1973).
162. Id. a t 365. There are approximately 23 cases since 1947 in which the Court has
purported to apply only a standard of rational relationship and has held legislation unconstitutional thereunder. Ten of these cases involved classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. See CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE,
THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA,
S. DOC.NO. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1597-1783 (1973).
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are normally invalid. In Welnberger v. Salfi,Ia the Court upheld
a provision in the Social Security Act imposing a duration-ofrelationship requirement for wives and stepchildren of deceased
wage earners, saying:
[Tlhe question raised is not whether a statutory provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual
position which generated the congressional concern reflected in
the statute. . . . Nor is the question whether the provision filters out a substantial part of the class which caused congressional concern, or whether it filters out more members of the
class than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress, its
concern having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of a n
abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally
have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualification
would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and
other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic r ~ 1 e . l ~ ~

How much more rigorous the judicial review inherent in this approach is than that inherent in the balancing of the level of irrationality against the realities of the legislative process depends,
of course, upon how much deference to legislative judgment the
Court intended by the phrase "could rationally have concluded.

D. Level of Irrationality v. Nature and Extent of Burden
Problems of a different nature arise if it is held that the
balance is between the level of irrationality of the classification
and the nature and extent of the burden placed upon the person
attacking the classification. On what principled basis can the
Court sort out the individual interests that require more precise
classifications from those that do not? The Court often refers to
the difference between legislation affecting "personal" interests
and legislation affecting "economic and social" interests. To the
extent that this means that personal interests protected under
some other constitutional provision merit a close examination of
and balancing against legislative interests affecting them, there
is no difficulty. But to the extent that it means, as Justice Mar163. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
164. Id. at 777.
LIB. REV. 269
165. Cf. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HAW. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV.
(19%).
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shall has often suggested in dissenting opinions,Yhat the Court
should weigh the societal importance of interests that are not
otherwise constitutionally protected, the distinction presents
genuine problems as to the scope of judicial review. Why should
the Court decide, for example, whether legislation limiting educational opportunities is more important than legislation limiting
the occupancy of houses to single families, with the result that a
classification in the first case must be more. closely related to a
legitimate legislative purpose than in the second? Certainly,
equal protection analysis does not help answer the q ~ e s t i o n . ~ ~ '

E. Level of Irrationality v. Nature of Classifying Factor
Similar problems arise when the balance is between the level
of irrationality of the classification and the nature of the classifying factor being used. As we have seen, the Court has found that
race, nationality, and alienage are constitutionally suspect classifications. With respect to sex and illegitimacy, however, the
Court has said that it need not decide whether they are suspect
classifications because it has been able to find the classifications
used to be irrational and arbitrary. Yet a reading of the cases
makes it clear that the Court's real objection has been to the
classifying factor, with the result that in sex and illegitimacy
cases the Court requires legislatures to use classifications more
closely related to a legislative purpose than it would with respect
to legislation using other classifying factors. 168 The question, then,
becomes one of deciding whether equal protection is restricted to
a limited number of classifications considered suspect or whether
it permits the Court to rank (perhaps along a scale with an infinite number of gradations) classifying factors, some requiring
more precision in classification than others.
166. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432 (1974); San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90
(1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519 (1970).
167. For the view that the Court should balance the competing policies see Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALEL.J. 123, 154 (1972):
Because the disputes that arise under the rubric of the Equal Protection Clause
have to do with the relative merits of competing public policies, judicial decisions obscure the central issues in such cases to the extent that they are based
on discussions of a statute's rationality. The nature of the conflict between the
political values a t stake as well as the underlying bases of judicial reasoning
would be made more explicit if the competing public policies were weighed
outright without diversionary discussions regarding a statute's rationality.
168. See the discussion in Section 11, supra.
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F. Importance of State Objective v. Nature and Extent of
Burden or Nature of Classifying Factor
Finally, one must consider whether in cases such as these the
Court should also weigh the importance of the state objective.
The Court has not yet purported to do so. Instead, as Gunther has
noted,169in recent cases in which the Court has invalidated statutes purportedly under the rational basis standard, it has required that the classification substantially further-be more than
minimally related to-the state objective, and that the objective
be a real rather than an imagined or illusory one. Justice Marshall himself, in his dissenting pleas for the Court to apply a
spectrum of standards, has not clearly said that the importance
of the state objective must be weighed in the balance when neither a constitutionally protected interest nor a suspect classification is involved.170Indeed, the Court has been concerned with the
importance of the state objective only in those cases where the
Court was in fact identifying either an interest as constitutionally
protected171or a classifying factor as suspect.172

G. Future of the Irrationality Approach
The most important issue posed for the future is the extent
to which the Court will move to require the states to show that
legislative classifications bear more than a minimal relationship
to an articulated, or possibly even genuine, legislative purpose.
Will the Court develop a calculus of interests that, although not
169. GUNTHER,
supra note 104, a t 661-63. For an excellent discussion of the range of
problems suggested in this section see id. a t 657-90. See also Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV.L. REV.1 (1972); cf. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO.L.J.
1071 (1974).
170. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 124 (1973):
The nature of our inquiry into the justifications for state discrimination is
essentially the same in all equal protection cases: We must consider the substantiality of the state interests sought to be served, and we must scrutinize the
reasonableness of the means by which the State has sought to advance its
interests.
Justice Marshall goes on to say that the compelling state interest standard applies when
constitutionally protected interests are burdened. He does not clarify whether in other
cases the close scrutiny should go only to the identification of the state interest and the
relation of the classification to it or whether the importance of the state interest should
also be weighed.
171. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting).
172. E.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (sex classification).
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otherwise accorded constitutional protection, require "more perfect" classifications when they are burdened? Recent cases suggest that the Court will not adopt the Marshall formulations.
Enormous problems of workload will result if the door is opened
to imaginative counsel to seek court review of wider and wider
Furthermore, the Court is uncomfortable
areas of 1egi~lation.l~~
with openly determining that some interests are to be accorded
more constitutional protection than others without a point of
constitutional reference more precise than the equal protection
clause. But the pressures to find some basis for invalidating
"bad" legislation will continue to be felt, and one can expect the
Court from time to time to seize upon the irrationality of classifications as a basis for expressing its displeasure with the substance
of such legislation.17*

What, then, should be the role for equal protection? What
limitations can it fairly be said to impose on the legislative process?
First, history makes it clear that the equal protection clause
was intended to invalidate legislation singling out the black race
for special burdens. From this, there is little difficulty in generalizing a similar protection for other racial and national groups that
have suffered a history of community discrimination. To conclude that all classifications based on race or nationality are constitutionally suspect extends the reach of this interpretation
somewhat further, but certainly not unacceptably so. The current
dispute over the validity of "benign discrimination" poses
-

-

-

-

173. No attempt has been made in this article to review the cases in the lower federal
courts and the state courts where the workload problem will appear. The extent to which
some courts are willing to use equal protection analysis to invalidate ordinary legislative
choices is indicated by the experience with automobile guest statutes. The California
Supreme Court held the California guest statute invalid as not bearing a substantial and
rational relationship to what the court conceived to be the legislative purposes. Brown v.
Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1973). The mixed reception that
this opinion received in other courts is reviewed in Comment, T h e Constitutionality of
Automobile Guest Statutes: A Roadmap to the Recent Equal Protection Challenges, 1975
B.Y.U.L. REV.99. In a later opinion upholding another portion of the California guest
statute, the California court indicated the need t o restrict the expansive role it had
assumed in applying equal protection. Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d 514, 546 P.2d 1033,
128 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1976).
174. For a quite different point of view regarding the issues treated in this section
and in portions of the other sections see Goodpaster, T h e Constitution and Fundamental
Rights, 15 ARIZ.L. REV.479 (1973).
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sharply the question whether the special protection is accorded
to all races or only to those that have suffered community discrimination. An even broader reach of interpretation is involved
in the question of whether other criteria, such as alienage, sex,
and illegitimacy, should be treated as constitutionally suspect.
The Court has so held with respect to alienage, but has purported
not to decide the issue for classifications based on sex and illegitimacy. It appears, however, that the Court is in fact treating female sex and illegitimacy as suspect classifications.
Second, equal protection has no significant role to play with
respect to classifications burdening constitutionally protected
interests. Legislation discriminating against such interests can
be, and often has been, invalidated without using equal protection analysis. Legislation that burdens such interests but does not
discriminate against them is normally tested by balancing the
importance of the state interest against the extent of the burden
on the protected interest. Those cases suggesting that a mere
showing of any burden on a constitutionally protected interest
requires the state to demonstrate that the classification is closely
tailored to a compelling state interest constitute a misapplication
of the equal protection doctrine. That misapplication may divert
attention away from the normal process of balancing the magnitude of the burden on the protected interest against the importance of the state interest served. This relatively recent aspect of
equal protection analysis, one applied in only a narrow range of
cases, should be abandoned as unnecessary and confusing.
Third, a major question remains unresolved regarding the
extent to which equal protection extends protection to an interest
in freedom from irrational classification. In fact, the Court rarely
overturns legislative classifications merely because they are
found to be irrational. Recent cases indicate that the Court may
be examining more closely classifications that impinge on a variety of personal interests not otherwise accorded constitutional
protection. This trend raises significant and difficult problems to
the extent that it portends any substantial degree of judicial supervision of the classifications contained in the vast outpourings
of federal and state legislatures. Its continuance would pose problems both of legitimacy and workload for the Court. One can
therefore predict that judicial use of the equal protection clause
to invalidate legislation not involving either suspect classifications or burdens on constitutionally protected interests will, as in
the past, be a relatively unusual event.

